The socio-economic, political, and cultural displacement of Adivasis: Implications of industrialisation, urbanisation, and gentrification in Jharkhand

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Abstract

Land displacement for the Adivasis has a multitude of consequences, ranging from socio-economic to political and cultural displacement. Using the lens of development and focusing on the state of Jharkhand, this paper presents the compounding effects of industrialisation, urbanisation, and gentrification on the Adivasis. Beyond the socio-economic displacement of losing their livelihood, the Adivasis of Jharkhand are also being politically displaced as they lose their seats in the central and state legislature due to gentrification. Finally, through education, the Adivasis are losing touch with their customs, traditions, and culture, resulting in cultural displacement. By presenting the findings, the paper highlights the magnitude of inequalities experienced by the Adivasis in Jharkhand as they remain marginalised on multiple fronts.

Keywords: Adivasi, Jharkhand, industrialisation, urbanisation, gentrification, land grab, development induced displacement, modernisation, socio-economic displacement, political displacement, cultural displacement.
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The consequence of land displacement is rarely just the displacement from land. Other forms of displacement often accompany it. This paper looks at Adivasis's socio-economic, political, and cultural displacement resulting from industrialisation, urbanisation, and gentrification (IUG) in Jharkhand. Following five months of fieldwork studying the conflict over the question of land in Jharkhand, the paper presents narratives on development and displacement from interviews held with members of the Indian parliament and the Jharkhand state assembly, government officials at both the central and state level, and Adivasi community members.

The state of Jharkhand was formed on 15 November 2000 when it bifurcated from its neighbouring state of Bihar. The creation of Jharkhand was centred on land and identity struggles as development policies failed to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Adivasis in the region. The word Jharkhand means 'the land of forests', and the Adivasis intended to protect their forests as it was central to their identity in the new state. After centuries of encounters with different groups and rejection of the universal growth model that was exploitative and destructive, the Adivasis developed a strong connection with the forests as they migrated away from the plains and into the hills. The birth of Jharkhand seemed to end a century long struggle for Adivasi autonomy. It brought hope that the disadvantaged Adivasi communities of Jharkhand would have more control over their destiny moving forward.

Less than three months after the formation of Jharkhand, eight Adivasis were shot for resisting the acquisition of land for the Koel-Karo dam (Corbridge 2002; Ghosh 2006). This retaliation by the state apparatus immediately suggested that Adivasi land rights would not feature prominently in the agenda of the newly formed state of Jharkhand. In only four years since its formation, Jharkhand topped the list of Adivasi land alienation in India according to The Annual Report of Ministry of Rural Development 2004-2005. As nearly two decades have passed, this narrative has not changed, and the benefit from statehood has been minimal to the Adivasis. The agenda for the creation of Jharkhand had slowly revealed itself as one of a resource-dependent state that had little regard for the Adivasi communities:

Most of the activists and sympathisers of the Jharkhand separate state movement believe that while the objective of the movement was to de-colonise the tribal habitat of the pre-British Jharkhand, the state of Jharkhand was carved out of Bihar with the goal of fulfilling the demand of 'Development' of the nation at the cost of continuing
'internal colonial situation' in Jharkhand. With the passage of the last 17 years since the formation of the state in 2000, the meaning of 'Development' has gradually surfaced with all its dimensions before the people of the state (Gautam 2020, p. 2).

In the name of development, the state has shown to blur and skirt the protective laws and even attempted to amend them to ensure the development trajectory hits no roadblocks. This is because Jharkhand sits on the mineral belt and is a rich mineral state, accounting for 30 per cent of India's coal, 23 per cent of iron ore, 33 per cent of copper, and 46 per cent of mica reserves, among other minerals. The problem for the Jharkhand state machinery is that these mineral resources are under Adivasi community lands protected by law from transfer to non-Adivasis for non-agricultural purposes. By sidestepping these laws and continuing expropriation, the government of Jharkhand showed its intention to change the narrative of development in the name of 'national interest'.

The Adivasi communities felt cheated and betrayed as the future envisioned with the formation of the new state was quickly being replaced with one of survival. In the name of development, forced industrialisation and displacement became common practice in a state where the Adivasis were meant to be protected by law. To make matters worse, there was little to no communication with the Adivasis, most of whom first learned about their land being taken when the information was posted in the local newspaper (Levien 2011). Once displaced, Adivasis were left to fend for themselves. Landless, alienated, marginalised, jobless and with the growing divide between the rich and the poor, they were left to question who benefited from the development projects.

Furthermore, companies brought skilled migrant labour into the region, rejecting local Adivasis for the jobs, which further displaced the Adivasis due to gentrification (Pingali 2020; Sundar 2005). Gentrification is the process of changing the demographic in a region through the influx of businesses and more affluent residents. For the Adivasis, gentrification in Jharkhand has implications at a socio-economic, political, and cultural level, which will be discussed in this article. Having lost their land and unable to support themselves, farmer deaths and suicides were common (Baka 2013; Banerjee-Guha 2013).

The question of development in Jharkhand

Jharkhand is one of the richest mineral states in India, and in the eyes of the Jharkhand government, land is an economic asset essential for the economic development of Jharkhand. As most of the mineral wealth is located in the Scheduled Areas where the Adivasis reside,
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the Adivasis are seen as 'backward' by the Jharkhand government for not recognising and taking advantage of the buried wealth under their land.

The term 'backward' became popular as the development theory of modernisation gained prominence in the 1950s. Modernisation was premised on bringing 'modernity' into the lives of 'traditional' societies. The argument for progress was that development was meant to be like the West; that is to say, the western countries and anything less were considered 'primitive' and 'backward' (Eisenstadt 1966; Nash 1963). Modernisation, as an ideology, furthered the capitalist agenda by portraying the capitalist class as the beacon of progress and the farmers as irrational who needed guidance and support. Industrialisation was considered the reason western countries were developing quicker, and thus, greater focus was put on the impeding factors to industrial development in the ‘less developed’ countries. Industrialisation was argued to be the driver of growth, while agriculture was relegated to the backseat, claiming its role was in providing the raw materials for industrial development. Therefore, land, especially mineral-rich land, took on a pivotal role around the world in the pursuit of ‘modernity’ and economically stagnant land was perceived to be empty, with idlers on that land seen as squatters (Pearce 2012).

Development in Jharkhand is a highly sensitive and contentious topic. It is marred in blood. In the name of development, people went to battle, fired shots, and lost lives. When spoken in the contemporary context, development is defined in economic terms and relies on natural resources to industrialise, modernise, and improve the nation’s GDP. The state and the middle- and upper-class generally support modernisation (Gautam 2020). The proponents of economic development argue that Adivasis oppose development. In their view, Adivasis are seen to hinder economic development. Therefore the state should take on a paternal role in ensuring that the Adivasis do not come in the way of development.

The Adivasis, however, argue that they are not against development. They, too, aspire for improved livelihood and wellbeing (Gautam 2020). However, the development they experience benefits only the elite, while they get further marginalised. On countless occasions, they were promised to be taken along on the development journey, but these promises have just remained false promises. The development they witnessed has had a minimal trickle-down effect on them. Many still live in darkness as they watch everyone experience the benefits of development from the land they got displaced. To the Adivasis, if development results in displacement and destruction, they do not consider that development.
In the resistance to the Koel-Karo dam project, a common slogan used by the Adivasis was “‘bijli bati kabua, dibri bati abua’, we do not want electricity, we are happy with our kerosene lamp’ (Gautam 2020, p. 2). This contention of development in the state of Jharkhand was summarised by Gautam (2020):

Every society aspires for change, but all changes are not welcomed. If the change does not take the community to a higher level of wellbeing and leads to deprivation, there will naturally be an opposition to such change. 'Development' is a form of change, basically economic. It is preached that a growth in economy of the country will eventually benefit every citizen and not just the rich. However, nobody living in the lower ladder of the economic benefit would prefer to wait when his or her share of wellbeing would 'trickle down'. This is especially so if the person asked to sacrifice his present livelihood resources and forced to live a lower level of livelihood for the sake of 'Development' (p. 3).

An important point to highlight here is that while this paper focuses on the Adivasis of Jharkhand, the narrative is much the same for Adivasis in other parts of India and the Indigenous communities in other parts of the world. The quest for industrialisation and economic development results in Indigenous communities worldwide being looked down upon for their perceived 'backwardness'. At the same time, the lands they reside on are under threat of expropriation.

**Industrialisation, urbanisation, and gentrification**

With industrialisation taking precedence over agriculture, Jharkhand witnessed an explosion of industries to capitalise on the natural resources in Jharkhand. Coal mines were opened in Dhanbad, copper in East Singhbhum, bauxite in north-west Ranchi, manganese, apatite, chromites, quartz, silica, steatite, asbestos and uranium in various parts of Singhbhum. The iron ore mines in Gua, Jamda, Noamundi, Chifia, Manoharpur, Kiriburu and Meghahatuburu contributed to 40 per cent of India's iron ore production. The influx of mining industries in Jharkhand attracted other non-metallic minerals industries such as cement factories, fertiliser factories, glass factories, agriculture-based industries, thermal power plants and hydro-electricity plants. The growth experienced with the intensification of mining and manufacturing activities led to the expansion in urbanisation in Jharkhand (Bhagat 2011). Urbanisation is the increase in population in urban centres where advanced technology and development projects exist. The increase in urban population can be due to
natural causes, such as excessive births over deaths or the migration of people from villages or rural areas to cities. In Jharkhand, the Adivasis are known to migrate to cities searching for jobs following their displacement from land due to industrialisation (Sharma 2013). Kumar and Baraik (2020) noted that industrialisation and mining are the two significant drivers of urbanisation in Jharkhand. ‘A glance at the urban scenario of Jharkhand shows that most industrialised districts are also the most urbanised ones’ (Kumar and Baraik 2020, p. 212).

The literature on gentrification in Jharkhand is scant. This is not to suggest that gentrification is non-existent in Jharkhand. As highlighted earlier, gentrification is changing demographics and landscape with the influx of businesses and affluent residents. It is widely acknowledged that gentrification is now everywhere (Vermeulen 2020). In Jharkhand, as more industries enter the state and lead to urbanisation, gentrification is pushing the Adivasis further into the fringes as more land is acquired for housing and infrastructure to accommodate the increasing number of skilled migrants. In the article *Contemporary Globalisation and the Politics of Space*, Banerjee-Guha (2011) discussed the politics of space when looking at the example of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and West Bengal as fast track industrialisation, mining, and gentrification activities are displacing and dispossessing a large number of locals to make cities more investment-friendly. ‘Gentrification is a central ingredient in the reproduction of capitalism’ where ‘spaces are produced according to the needs of middle- and upper-income users and in which the indigenous population is displaced’ (Cocola-Gant 2019, p. 18).

Tensions and conflict may arise from IUG as it is often dominated by the state and involves displacement. In other words, development induced displacement is implicit in the process of IUG. As such, in the name of development, IUG seeks to meet the needs and aspirations of the middle- and upper-class elite. Therefore, it is not surprising that ‘public purpose often serves as a façade’ for IUG to make way for development (Walicki and Swain 2018, p. 10).

In Jharkhand, the process of IUG is turning Adivasis into a minority. There is fear among the Adivasis that the steady influx of outsiders into Jharkhand will further marginalise them (Singh 2019). Sundar (2005) goes as far as to state that the political parties are known even to attract industries and investment and encourage immigration further to reduce the proportion of Adivasis in the state. The state of Jharkhand, which was envisioned to be an 'Adivasi state'
is slowly slipping away from the hands of the Adivasis. Industrialisation, followed by urbanisation and gentrification in Jharkhand, is a severe threat to Adivasis.

**Displacement: Implications of development**

Displacement involves re-socialising and readjusting to an unfamiliar environment because one’s connection to their land, source of livelihood, and culture has been disturbed. According to Kumar (2018), displacement is either physical or economic. Physical displacement involves physical relocation due to the loss of land, water, or forest. On the other hand, economic displacement involves the interruption or elimination of access to productive assets without physical relocation.

However, the implications of land displacement are multi-fold and go beyond physical and economic displacement. In the article *Displacement and Socio-Economic Plight of Tribal Population in Jharkhand with Special Reference to Jharia Coal Belt*, Malkhandi (2018) identified a cascading list of consequences resulting from land displacement. These included enslavement as cheap casual labourers, landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, food insecurity, loss of access to common property, social disintegration, and increased morbidity and mortality. According to Malkhandi, Adivasis in Jharkhand are being displaced for large development projects, including irrigation dams, hydroelectric and thermal power plants, coal mines and mineral-based industries. Despite the National Policy for Rehabilitation and Resettlement, Adivasis continue to be displaced forcefully without satisfactory rehabilitation.

While Malkhandi highlighted most of the concerns related to displacement, some were missed. These include the threat to cultural livelihood and life, sexual exploitation of women, and the poverty trap compelling parents from not sending their children to school instead of getting their help in bringing money into the family (Mahto 2018). When discussing the threat to cultural livelihood and life, though, the author barely discussed the threat to cultural livelihood and stated, ‘in the tribal state of Jharkhand, the roots of cultural diversity have been threatened by the development forces of the so-called government policies. It has been difficult for the ethnic clans to safeguard their culture’ (p. 208). This article will expand on the cultural displacement experienced by Adivasis because of standardised education.

In a detailed study on the impact of development-induced displacement, Kumari (2016) elaborates on the contributing factors to displacement's socio-economic, cultural, and environmental impacts. The contributing factors to economic impact include joblessness, reduced family income, increased daily wage workers, and reduced earning family members.
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The contributing factors to social impact include social disintegration resulting from alienation from their society, breaking up of joint families to nuclear families to benefit from rehabilitation package, falling under the jurisdiction of different *panchayat* after resettlement or losing local self-governance body depending on geographical relocation, and changing family dynamics as women are reduced from an earning member of the family to a dependent member of the family as compensation money is given to the males as the head of the household. The contributing factors to cultural impact include losing connection to their land, change in eating habits, clothing, and recreation due to reduced income, and lack of interest in celebrating traditional festivals due to the breakaway from social groups. Finally, the contributing factors to environmental impact include mass deforestation, submerging high-quality land to construct dams, destruction of life and property, loss of wildlife and flora, erosion, sinkholes, pollution of air, water, noise, and soil from open cast mining activities. These environmental impacts also lead to health impacts such as severe respiratory problems from breathing polluted air and harmful gases, eating, and drinking contaminated food and water from soil and water pollution.

While the implications of displacement are widely documented, this article will highlight Adivasis's socio-economic, political, and cultural displacement in Jharkhand as a result of IUG.

**Socio-economic displacement of Adivasis**

The development narrative used by the government officials in Jharkhand is that industrialisation comes with the promise of better jobs and lifestyles. However, this promise of better jobs and lifestyle comes with a caveat of being skilled to fill the positions in the industry, which most of the Adivasis lack. According to the *Jharkhand Economic Survey*, the Adivasis are lagging behind the rest of the society and lack the skills required to be marketable in today’s changing world. In an interview with a former Deputy Commissioner in Jharkhand, the interviewee stated that the Adivasis lack the skills and expertise to take advantage of the jobs being created by the industries. He noted that the Adivasis ‘were probably employable only at the time of setting up factory as wage or manual labourers’ (Jharkhand Bureaucrat Interviewee 7 2018). They were mainly consigned to menial, low-paid work as cleaners or gardeners (Corbridge 2002). Unable to fill the jobs created by these investment projects, the Adivasis are losing out to growing skilled migrants coming in to fill these jobs (Pingali 2020). Increased migration comes with increased displacement as more
land is acquired to urbanise the area with housing, roads, schools, and hospitals. Therefore, industrialisation in Jharkhand leads to land displacement and socio-economic displacement for the Adivasis. The former Deputy Commissioner in Jharkhand went on to say in his interview:

His [Adivasi's] land is gone. He was assured some crop at the end of monsoon; that is gone. The little bit of money he had; that is gone in the local brewery, and the benefit which is coming out of the factory and industries is being enjoyed by someone else (Jharkhand Bureaucrat Interviewee 7 2018).

The Adivasis have always had to raise the issue of ‘development’ because they do not receive much benefit from these projects. Their suffrage has not been rewarded in kind as in most instances after they are displaced, empirical studies have noted that they struggle to find a job, get further marginalised, become poor, malnourished, and fear the prospect of death (Ghosh 2006; Shah 2010). According to an interview with a CSO, the Adivasis are being left out of the development by not providing enough support for agriculture: ‘from the beginning, the intention of the government was pro-mining, pro-investor. Until now, the government does not have an agriculture policy. They have mining and industrial policy, and they are updating them as required’ (CSO Interviewee 5 2017). This stance was confirmed by a report released by the Bindra Institute for Research, Study and Action (BIRSA).

Over the years, agriculture has been deliberately kept improvised so as to hasten the process of rural to urban migration. Moving people out of farming is seen as the big ticket reform that the country is waiting for, considered to be absolutely essential for economic growth (Ghosh 2018, p. i).

Some scholars argue that there is an argument for bypassing the agrarian question in today's globalised world. As explained by Lerche (2013), ‘agriculture does not appear to support growth significantly in Indian non-agricultural sectors, neither through capital transfers nor through the creation of major rural market for industrial produce’ (p. 400). With the growing dominance of globalisation, where the production, distribution and consumption of agriculture are globalised, the need for capitalism in agriculture ceased to be a prerequisite for capital accumulation (Lerche 2013). The agrarian question in India is being bypassed due to free trade, free markets, and foreign direct investment with the inflow of foreign capital (Bernstein 2006; Byres 1991). However, an activist in his interview stressed that bypassing the agrarian question is risky and could lead to an uprising by the agrarian sector:
The agrarian question is being bypassed by the elites. But it cannot be bypassed because of two reasons. First, the challenge of the revolutionary left is centred on [the] agrarian question, and second, just for the opposite reason, in electoral politics, these are the big chunks of voters. So, unless you address the agrarian question, you cannot have peace in society. Violence is increasing in India today because of this reason, both in tribal and other rural areas… Agrarian question will be the next central question of struggle… That is why it is going to cause more and more violence. It is being bypassed today at peril, so it has to become the central focus [sic] (CSO Interviewee 9 2018; Basu and Das 2013).

Addressing the agrarian question will be important in Jharkhand, and the government of Jharkhand will need to make sure steps are put in place to support the agrarian economy while transitioning to an industrialised economy. Otherwise, as highlighted in an interview with a civil servant from the Department of Panchayati Raj, the transition from an agrarian economy to an industrialised economy leaves behind at least a generation of the Adivasi population:

If you are making a move from an agrarian economy to industrialised economies, I don't think for even 30-40 years they will benefit from these because they are not equipped temperamentally, emotionally, and skill wise. So, even if better opportunities are created, they are not well equipped to take advantage of the opportunity created by such investments. That's why displacement is an issue. In simple mathematics, you can say the industry will provide you with jobs, but whether they [Adivasis] are empowered enough to take advantage of this benefit should be a major concern of the policy. If you take this task later on, it will be too late. If the industry comes, the industry will start running [and] somebody else will take the jobs there. And by the time they come to that level, it will be too late. A generation [of Adivasis] would have suffered (Jharkhand Bureaucrat Interviewee 1 2017).

Despite the socio-economic displacement of the Adivasis in Jharkhand, the drive to pursue the path of development remained strong among the state officials. The state officials believe that industrialisation would ultimately trickle-down and benefit the Adivasis. They argued that: ‘tribals cannot remain for all time’ (Jharkhand Politician Interviewee 4 2018) as ‘their progress is too slow’ (Jharkhand Bureaucrat Interviewee 7 2018).
Political displacement of Adivasis

For the Adivasis, the consequence of land displacement is not merely a socio-economic displacement but also a political displacement. In India, the demographic of the Adivasis dictates the political power and representation of Adivasis in the state and central legislature. In other words, the number of seats reserved in the government for the Adivasis is based on the Adivasi population as per the previous census. In a state like Jharkhand, where the government of Jharkhand is paving the way for new industries to be set up, the challenge for the Adivasis is gentrification. As noted previously in an interview with the former Deputy Commissioner in Jharkhand, Adivasis lack the skills to fill many of the jobs being created by the industries. Unable to fill these positions, skilled migrants from other states enter Jharkhand to fill these positions. As more migrants enter Jharkhand, the proportions of Adivasis shrink, consequently impacting their political representation in positions of power. A state envisioned as an 'Adivasi state', where the Adivasis were meant to be a majority and hold significant political power, was not to be. In an interview with the former Deputy Commissioner of Jharkhand, he explained how the creation of Jharkhand did not fulfil the vision of an Adivasi state for the Adivasis:

At one point, there were only 28 tribal MLAs in Bihar. So, anyway, they couldn't dream of having political power in Bihar. But here in Jharkhand, which was created with a dream of tribals determining and controlling their own destiny, and controlling local political power, suddenly they realised that in Jharkhand, out of 81 seats, they have only 28 (Jharkhand Bureaucrat Interviewee 7 2018).

According to the Bihar Reorganisation Bill that the Parliament of India passed on 2 August 2000, the Jharkhand government was formed using the census figures of 1971: 'the delimitation of constituencies in the States of Bihar and Jharkhand shall be determined on the basis of the published figures of the census taken in the year 1971' (Central Government Act 2000). The delimitation occurs every twenty years based on the previous census data, and the subsequent delimitation happened in 2006 based on the 2001 census data.

In 2006, when the first delimitation happened in the newly formed state of Jharkhand based on the census in 2001, the Adivasis were awakened to a stark reality. Based on the 2001 census data, the reservation of seats for the Adivasis in official positions was meant to drop from 28 to 22 (Robin 2012). This realisation of their political displacement in Jharkhand led to massive protests, resulting in the President of India passing an order to say that the
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delimitation of 2006 would not apply in the state of Jharkhand until 2026 when the subsequent delimitation takes place based on the 2021 census (The Economic Time 2008). Therefore, for the moment, the Adivasis maintain 28 seats in Jharkhand, and they now wait in fear until 2026 to learn if their number of seats in the Jharkhand government will fall from 28 to 22 or even lower based on the 2021 census. Their dream of an ‘Adivasi state’ is disappearing as even in Jharkhand; the Adivasis are getting politically displaced and losing their power to stop the tide of top-down influence on the Adivasis.

**Cultural displacement of Adivasis**

Beyond social-economic and political displacement, Adivasis in Jharkhand are also experiencing cultural displacement. Coming back to the debates of development, the notion of transforming ‘traditional’ societies to ‘modernity’ holds strong in the eyes of the Jharkhand government as customs, traditions, and cultures are all considered to be ‘backward’ by the state machinery. According to the government, customs, traditions, and cultures are detrimental to the economic development of Jharkhand. These customs, traditions, and cultures are considered not to have a place in the modern economy as emotions replace rational thought. For example, the question of land; the Jharkhand government considers land to be an economic asset that should be bought and sold to extract the highest economic value and aid in the development of the state. This viewpoint of land contradicts the Adivasis, who argued that land is not an asset but rather a life-giving source and one must live in synergy with it. According to the government of Jharkhand, the Adivasis hold an emotional attachment to their land, which hinders the ability to utilise the land for economic development. Therefore, the government of Jharkhand validates its role as a paternal caretaker by taking on the responsibility of ‘mainstreaming’ the Adivasis to ensure the development trajectory of Jharkhand goes unhindered.

To this end, the government of Jharkhand employs various methods to bring the Adivasis into the ‘modern’ fold. Arguably the most popular method used is education. The importance of education as a tool to ‘modernise’, ‘standardise’, ‘mainstream’ the masses, not just the Adivasis, has been studied extensively (Martinussen 1997; Peet and Hartwick 2009). Education is a powerful mechanism that teaches a person from a very young age what is acceptable and what is not, thereby inculcating a vision of how to aspire as citizens of the state. In other words, education plays an essential role in the government's arsenal to skill up the workforce that would seek out ‘modern’ forms of employment, such as in an industry, and
portray the 'modern' ideals of the West. More importantly, the government expects alignment with the state's vision of development and fewer dissent voices by imparting these ideals.

For the Adivasis, however, the consequence of standardised education is the loss of centuries old culture, tradition, and knowledge that are given no importance but also looked down upon in the quest for 'modernity'. This impact of displacement on the socio-economic and culture of the Adivasis was expressed by a civil servant from the Department of Panchayati Raj in his interview:

Ultimately this displacement is not only the displacement of their land but displacement from their whole cultural [and] social. They may not be comfortable with better money somewhere. Even if they are given better access to economic means, they may not be so satisfied because you have robbed them of their cultural heritage (Jharkhand Bureaucrat Interviewee 1 2017).

Conclusion

Being a mineral-rich state, Jharkhand has a long history of subjugating Adivasis to development-induced displacement. This paper focused on the compounding consequences of displacement experienced by the Adivasis in the state of Jharkhand, ranging from socio-economic, political, and cultural. Using first-hand narratives from the interviews with Jharkhand state officials and Adivasi community members, this paper showcased how the Adivasis were still considered ‘backward’ by the state machinery and lacked the skills to fill the roles created by the industries. Unable to fill the positions created by the industries, Jharkhand experienced an influx of skilled migrants which impacted the demographic of the state. Increased skilled migration resulted in the proportion of Adivasis in Jharkhand decreasing, thereby almost reducing the number of seats reserved for the Adivasis in central and state legislature. The Adivasis now wait anxiously until 2026 to learn if the number of seats reserved for the Adivasis in central and state legislature remains the same or drops. In other words, IUG is resulting in political displacement for the Adivasis. Finally, in the pursuit of ‘modernising’ the economy, the government of Jharkhand relies on education as a tool to mould the masses into acting as the citizens of the state and portraying the ideals of the West. For the Adivasis, standardised education risks eradicating centuries of customs, traditions, culture, and knowledge, as these customs, traditions, culture, and knowledge are not seen as valuable in the 'modern' society. Therefore, IUG results in the socio-economic, political, and cultural displacement of the Adivasis in Jharkhand.
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References


